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Abstract— This paper analyzes the phenomenon of 
cooperation in modern supply chains in the light of 
Cooperative Game Theory. The author provides a 
detailed discussion on the meaning of cooperation in 
supply chains, its motives, outcomes and barriers. A 
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identified to clarify and to suggest future research 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, the competitive, fast-moving business 
environment has permanently transformed the 
supply chain and the management of its functions. 
The main idea of the supply chain has been 
described as “something that consists of elements 
that are linked to each of their two immediate 
neighbors and which jointly provide a strong but 
flexible connection” [1]. However, this traditional 
view of a “chain” where different functions/firms 
are linked in a linear and simple manner is no 
longer a reality given the complex and global 
structure of business [2]. Thus, the paradigm of the 
modern supply chain has metamorphosed into a 
nonlinear complex network that allows efficient 
interactions among thousands of suppliers and 
partners, regardless of their size, location, or 
number of products. We now talk about the “supply 
chain network” rather than the “supply chain.” 
Previous studies such as [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] have 
emphasized the network character of support chain 
management. Various new terminologies have also 
been proposed in this growing field. [4] and [9] 
introduced the “supply network,” [7] proposed the 
term “netchain,” while [8] discussed “supply chain 
networks”.  
The key word in these definitions is the term 
”network,” which was defined by [10] as a lateral 
and horizontal exchange of resources and 
communication between independent partners. As 
mentioned by [11] the definitions of networks are 
grouped around two key concepts: (1) a model of 
an interaction based on exchange and relationships, 
and (2) a flow of resources between independent 
units. The network character of supply chains has 
been the subject of several previous studies. Many 
of these studies have considered supply chain 
networks from strategic and social viewpoints [5, 
7]. Others have focused on highlighting the 
changes in various industries. For instance, [12] 
studied aspects of vertical coordination in the US 
food industry. [13] presented insights into the 
evolution of partnerships in meat industry 
networks. [11, 14] focused on the network 
character of the agri-food industry. [8] provide 
many useful examples that clearly illustrate the 
typical challenges faced by the automotive, 
aerospace, and defense industries, where an 
emphasis on academic research into supply chain 
networks was stressed. An early research 
framework was described by [3]. 
Given the current economic climate and the 
complexity of supply chain networks, companies 
need to enhance their competitive advantage in the 
marketplace by developing and maintaining close 
relationships. Thus, the trend in modern supply 
chain networks is to seek partnerships that improve 
efficiency in the face of increasing globalization 
and outsourcing. For example, in recent years, but 
particularly in the last decade, the terms “supply 
chain cooperation” and ”supply chain 
coordination” have been used increasingly. The 
usage of these terms has been growing because of 
changes in the business landscape. Indeed, in 
current supply chain networks, organizations are 
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considering cooperation and the coordination of 
their business processes more strategically, as well 
as searching for more refined and closer 
relationships with other supply chain network 
participants. These strategies appear to be a key 
factor that affects competitiveness. However, 
although this is a controversial topic in both 
academia and industry, a definition of supply chain 
cooperation/supply chain coordination continues to 
elude many. For example, there have been many 
recent studies of this topic and a growing number 
of companies choose these strategies to manage 
their supply chains, but a great deal of confusion 
still remains. After evaluating previous research in 
this area, we failed to identify a single consistent 
definition of these concepts. Indeed, various terms 
such as “cooperation” are often used 
interchangeably with “coordination” and 
sometimes with “collaboration.” However, these 
terms actually describe different levels of supply 
chain relationships. In the following, based on 
organizational studies and research related to 
supply chain networks, we aim to clarify the 
boundaries between each of these terms. 
1.1 Coordination 
In a supply chain network, companies have 
individual (private) goals and objectives that they 
can achieve by themselves. In this case, they can 
control and execute their plans independently. 
However, all companies are linked by the 
integrated nature of the supply chain business in 
which they participate and thus they operate in the 
same environment. However, conflicts may arise in 
this environment. Therefore, companies need to 
synchronize their activities in order to avoid 
harmful interactions. This process is called 
coordination. In other words, coordination within a 
supply chain is a strategic response to the problems 
caused by inter-organizational dependencies within 
the chain. Coordination occurs between two or 
more firms, where tight control requires a 
coordination mechanism that synchronizes two or 
more specific functions [15]. In current supply 
chain networks, because information technology is 
becoming cheaper to deploy, the information 
systems of firms are more strongly linked and they 
engage in more coordination mechanisms, such as 
collaborative planning, forecasting, and vendor-
managed inventories, to obtain a clearer 
appreciation of demand information [16]. In 
general, the term “coordination” has been used 
quite often in previous studies to qualify buyer-
supplier (or bilateral) relationships. 
1.2  Cooperation 
Cooperation originates from the Latin words co, 
meaning “together,” and operari, meaning “to 
work.” Thus, cooperation refers to situations where 
multiple participants work together to achieve 
mutual goals. Cooperation has been defined as joint 
striving toward a common object or goal [17]. 
According to [18], cooperation is an activity where 
potential collaborators are viewed as providing the 
means by which a divisible goal or object desired 
by the parties may be obtained and shared. In 
summary, cooperation is conceptualized as “a set of 
joint actions of firms in close relationship to 
accomplish a common set of goals that bring 
mutual benefits” [15]. By working together and 
coordinating their actions, the supply chain 
participants become partners in an alliance [19]. 
The term “alliance” is often used to describe 
cooperative behaviors in an interfirm context. [20] 
defined an alliance as a collaborative relationship 
among firms to achieve a common goal that each 
firm could not easily accomplish alone. Similarly, 
[21] defined an alliance as a broad term that refers 
to collaborative arrangements in which participants 
explicitly agree to work together in the belief that, 
by doing so, they are more likely to succeed than 
by working alone. [22] suggest that alliances 
encompass a variety of agreements that allow two 
or more firms to pool their resources to pursue 
specific market opportunities. 
The present study focuses on cooperation and 
strategic alliances as keys to business success and 
competitiveness in supply chain networks. 
2. Research Methodology  
Cooperation and alliance formation appear to be 
successful strategies and they comprise an 
interesting trend in supply chain networks, but this 
raises various challenging questions, as follows. 
• Why cooperate?  
• How is cooperation achieved? 
• What are the outcomes of cooperation? 
• What factors can hinder the achievement 
of cooperation? 
The answers to these questions are summarized in 
Appendix 1 and they are discussed in the following 
sections. 
2.1 Why Cooperate? 
The business world is a rapidly changing 
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landscape, which is characterized by unprecedented 
complexity. The increase in global trade means that 
supply chains are now even longer and more 
dynamic. The profound impact of globalization on 
traditional supply chains requires that many 
companies must exceed the borders of individual 
actions to achieve collective actions/strategies that 
can handle the geographical distribution of supply 
chain entities, different laws, and customs. These 
cooperative strategies are also reinforced by the 
creation of new supply chain concepts such as third 
party logistics providers [23, 24]. 
Recent advances in information and 
communication technology have also played a key 
role in changing the way that business is 
conducted. Thus, distinct supply chain entities that 
can access high quality information have emerged 
in supply chains, thereby generating new 
challenges and trends. The proliferation of the 
Internet and e-commerce means that time 
requirements have been reduced. Indeed, the flow 
of information and orders is almost instantaneous, 
especially when procurement systems are 
electronically integrated with the sales and 
production systems of thei suppliers. These new 
technological advances include radio frequency 
identification technology and electronic data 
interchange. For a detailed description of new 
trends in supply chain design and management with 
an emphasis on technologies and methodologies we 
refer the reader to [25]. 
 
2.2 How is Cooperation Achieved? 
Companies may use several forms of cooperation 
to compete successfully, such as mergers, joint 
ventures, joint investment in specific assets, joint 
replenishment, and shipment consolidation. 
Detailed descriptions of these mechanisms are 
outside the scope of this study, but the main aim of 
cooperation in supply chain networks is to ensure 
that independent firms share their holding 
infrastructures and ordering channels. Therefore, 
when an alliance forms between firms, each firm 
works with the best holding technology and 
ordering channels in the coalition. Thus, the 
coalition members manage their cost components 
(purchasing, holding inventory, etc.) at the 
minimum cost to the coalition members [26]. In 
this context, cooperation refers to situations where 
the activities and/or the resources of some 
independent firms are pooled and joint problems 
are solved. Clearly, information sharing is a key 
determinant of the success and achievement of 
supply chain partnerships [27, 28, 29]. For 
example, in order to obtain joint solutions to their 
problems, supply chain actors must agree to sharing 
information to address these problems [30]. 
 
2.3  What are the Outcomes of 
Cooperation? 
If they cooperate, companies can win new 
business, achieve market penetration, improve their 
performance, and increase their profitability. Thus, 
cooperative strategies allow firms to maintain 
lower costs, but while improving their levels of 
service to meet the growing expectations of 
customers. In general, cooperation brings three 
main benefits to supply chain networks: reduced 
costs, risk pooling, and enhanced negotiation 
power. The first main advantage of cooperation is 
cost reduction by sharing resources and economies 
of scale. Indeed, depending on the form of 
cooperation, the inventory levels and/or 
transportation costs are often reduced. Moreover, 
with joint orders, many economies of scale can be 
achieved and significant savings can be obtained 
when joint investments in specific assets occur. The 
second issue is better risk management. Indeed, 
within a supply chain, an actor no longer needs to 
address the internal and external disturbances that 
affect them on their own. In a given alliance, risk 
management becomes a collective activity, rather 
than individual. The last issue is negotiation power. 
When several actors are willing to cooperate, they 
create an entity that shares and pools their forces. 
Therefore, these actors benefit from greater power 
during negotiations in their environment. For 
example, several actors may decide to collaborate 
to impose lower prices on their supplier. 
 
2.4 What Factors Can Hinder the Success 
of Cooperation? 
Many studies in industry and academia have 
emphasized the importance of cooperation in 
supply chains given the current economic climate. 
However, many cooperative supply chain structures 
have failed to achieve the expected benefits [31]. 
Similar to previous studies that focused on the 
contributions and impacts of cooperation on the 
effectiveness of logistic networks, the barriers that 
can hinder the success of cooperative supply chain 
network structures have been the subject of a 
separate research area (for example, [31, 32, 33]). 
Some of these studies have suggested that 
conceptualizing strategic alliances as social 
dilemmas helps to understand how cooperation can 
be achieved in strategic alliances and sustained 
over time [21]. It has been shown that the success 
of supply chain alliances is not related simply to 
the intention to cooperate. For example, the fact 
that supply chain partners willingly choose to 
cooperate does not necessarily ensure that they will 
do so successfully. Several factors can hinder the 
development and success of partnership in supply 
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chain networks, including trust between partners, 
compromise, interdependency or mutual 
dependency between partners, organizational 
compatibility (i.e., goals, objectives, shared 
operational philosophy, and corporate culture), 
shared vision, and key processes [34]. In addition, 
“inter-firm rivalry” [32] or misalignments may 
occur when allying the efforts of firms to 
cooperate, including a reluctance to share 
information, skills, and processes, as well as 
opportunistic behavior [5, 35]. 
In addition to the aforementioned elements that 
may cause the failure of a partnership even before 
its formation, another type of barrier is particularly 
relevant to the success of supply chain alliances. 
This barrier does not affect the creation of value, 
but instead it comprises attempts to claim an unfair 
share of the value that is created [36]. Indeed, 
ensuring that cooperating agents agree about how 
to share the costs or divide the benefits that they 
jointly create has been identified as a major 
obstacle that hinders the formation of collaborative 
structures [37].  
Therefore, obtaining an unfair share of the value 
created may give rise to defecting actors. Defection 
is a general term that refers to any form of non-
cooperative behavior by participants in a social 
dilemma [33]. In supply chain a network, defection 
is often used to refer to the fact that one (or more) 
participant leaves their alliance (network) to work 
on their own or join another existing alliance. 
Cooperative game theory is used to study these 
problems in social networks such as supply chain 
networks. In particular, one of the main 
contributions of cooperative game theory is to 
provide methods that allow all cooperating agents 
to agree about how to allocate the costs or to share 
benefits to ensure that each party feels that 
participating in a coalition is worthwhile for its 
own sake [38]. 
 
2.5  The Challenges of Cooperation 
The questions rose above regarding coalitional 
behavior and cooperative strategies may be 
classified into two major problems (see Figure 1): 
(1) alliance formation and (2) profit/cost allocation. 
 Alliance Formation: This problem concerns the 
formation of alliances/coalitions by supply chain 
agents, i.e., the partitioning of cooperating actors 
into exhaustive and disjoint alliances to form the 
so-called coalition structure (partition). For each 
coalition, an associated optimization problem needs 
to be solved, which involves pooling the activities 
and/or resources of the agents in the coalition and 
solving this joint problem. For example, the 
optimal reorder policy of each coalition has to be 
determined in a joint replenishment system. 
Profit/Cost Allocation: After solving the questions 
of alliance formation and joint problem 
optimization, the problem of how to divide the 
overall value created among the cooperating actors 
needs to be addressed, where each actor is 
associated with a portion of the savings generated 
by their involvement in the coalition. This problem 
is as important as alliance formation because each 
actor is usually interested in what they will gain 
individually from the cooperation. Moreover, any 
cases of “unfair” allocation will immediately lead 
to the end of the alliance. Thus, cooperative game 
theory using so-called core allocations is often 
employed to address the payoff division question.  
 
Obviously, the problems of alliance formation 
and profit allocation are mutually dependent. 
Indeed, [39] emphasized that these two aspects of 
coalitional behavior are closely related. First, the 
final allocation of payoffs to the players depends on 
the coalitions that form. Second, the coalitions that 
are finally formed depend on the payoffs available 
to each player in each of the coalitions. The 
coalition that an actor wants to join depends on the 
portion of savings that this actor will gain from 
each potential coalition. Thus, the payoffs influence 
the coalition structure and vice versa. A more 
detailed discussion on the potential of cooperative 
game theory for supply chain management is 
provided in [40]. 
 
Figure 1. Challenges of coalitional behavior  
 
 
3 Literature Review 
The discussion above clearly emphasizes the 
revolutionary move from simple supply chains to 
supply chain networks, where firms may compete 
and/or cooperate to achieve sustainable advantages. 
Previous studies of supply chain management 
have reacted to these changes and advances by 
providing analytical and theoretical support, as well 
as methodologies, for the areas of competition, 
cooperation, and coordination in supply chain 
networks. The cooperative and non-cooperative 
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branches of game theory have played important 
roles in the analysis and understanding of 
cooperative and competitive interactions among 
supply chain participants. For example, [41] 
provided many examples of competition and 
cooperation in business environments. 
In the following, we give a brief description of 
competition and coordination in supply chains. 
Subsequently, we focus on providing a detailed 
overview of the study of cooperation in supply 
chain networks based on cooperative game theory. 
 
3.1 Buyer-Supplier Coordination 
Many previous studies have aimed to understand 
bilateral buyer-supplier relationships, thereby 
identifying operational plans that align the 
objectives of the buyer and the supplier in order to 
ensure better performance and cost minimization in 
the chain. In this context, coordination mechanisms 
may be defined as a joint policy achieved by both 
parties, which is characterized by an agreement or 
contract, such as a quantity discount, credit option, 
buy back/return policies, quantity flexibility, or a 
commitment to a purchase quantity (see [42, 43]). 
In general, previous studies in this area may be 
characterized as analyses of competitive and 
cooperative inventory policies in the vendor-buyer 
system, including [44, 45, 46]. We should mention 
that many coordination mechanisms have been 
extended to systems with multiple retailers (e.g., 
[47, 48]). Non-cooperative game theory has been 
used often to understand buyer-supplier 
interactions. Indeed, the buyer and supplier 
inventories can be modeled as two-person games 
(competitive games), where the main aim is to find 
an equilibrium strategy (e.g., Pareto, Nash, and 
Stackelberg equilibria). Detailed surveys of this 
topic have been made by [49] and [50]. 
 
3.2 Inventory Centralization Games 
For a long time, cooperative game theory did not 
attract the same level of attention in economics 
research as non-cooperative game theory. 
Therefore, few studies addressed supply chain 
management based on cooperative game theory 
compared with non-cooperative games. However, 
in the last few years, many studies have focused on 
the great potential of cooperative game theory for 
understanding business and supply chain 
applications. Thus, the analysis of operations re-
search problems using cooperative game theory is 
now a major trend and a focus of modern sup-ply 
chain management research. 
Cooperative game theory focuses mainly on the 
outcomes of games in terms of the value created by 
cooperation among many actors (players). Thus, its 
main contribution to supply chain management is 
in facilitating the modeling of outcomes of 
complex business process and supply chains with 
centralized decisions and actions. However, the 
effect of cooperation and centralization (in terms of 
created value and outcomes) is not a new topic in 
supply chain management re-search. For example, 
inventory management centralization and multi-
retailer inventory joint replenishment systems have 
been investigated extensively since the 1980s (e.g., 
[51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56]). Using inventory 
management centralization and joint replenishment 
frameworks, totally centralized chains were shown 
to be more efficient than decentralized chains and 
solutions have been found that minimize the total 
system-wide costs and that maximize the total 
system-wide profits. However, in most of these 
studies, the supply chains were assumed to belong 
to one actor. As a consequence, the study of the 
interactions and relationships between supply chain 
participants, as well as the question of how to 
divide the created value, were ignored completely 
for many years. In cooperative game theory 
settings, these situations and new ones can be 
modeled differently, but the main focus concerns 
questions of stability and dividing savings. 
In a supply chain, the participants may maintain 
total decentralized strategies, which mean that each 
will maintain their standalone situation and aim to 
optimize their own system based on specific 
economic parameters and objectives. By moving 
away from decentralized strategies, the supply 
chain participants may adopt cooperative strategies 
to centralize their decisions and operate jointly 
(e.g., they may share/mutualize some physical 
resources such as warehouses or vehicle fleets, or 
perform projects jointly such as shipment 
consolidation and joint replenishment). Thus, each 
of them will receive a portion of the savings 
achieved. Inventory centralization games refer to 
the study of cooperative behavior in centralized 
supply chains in terms of alliance formation and 
savings allocation. Each centralized model is 
associated with a cooperative game where the 
supply chain participants are the players. The value 
of a coalition to players comprises the 
savings/value that the players obtain jointly, which 
they divide among themselves. Of course, the 
allocation of the value created should satisfy many 
properties. For example, the maintenance of 
stability is satisfied by the so-called core 
allocations, i.e., the allocation of the created value 
among the cooperating actors to ensure that no 
group of actors wants to behave independently. 
Recently, inventory centralization games have 
been studied in various multi-retailer inventory 
systems (reviewed by [49, 50]). [57] provided a 
fascinating and detailed survey of exclusive 
cooperative game theory use in supply chain 
management. In the following, we consider some 
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inventory centralization games that are closely 
related to the present study. We classify these 
games in terms of the inventory models that they 
employ. Thus, we distinguish two main 
environmental classes: stochastic and deterministic. 
In general, we identify newsvendor games in 
stochastic inventory environments. In deterministic 
environment, we identify economic lot-sizing 
games and inventory games. Finally, we focus on 
games with coalition structures. The proposed 
classification is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
3.3 Newsvendor games 
The newsvendor game problem refers to a 
situation where a store (newsvendor) addresses a 
random demand for newspapers by ordering a 
specific amount of newspapers at the beginning of 
each day (period). Given their nature, the 
newspapers can be sold only on the day when they 
are ordered. Therefore, at the end of the day 
(period), the unsold newspapers are lost or 
discounted. [58] provides a detailed review of 
newsvendor models. Newsvendor games are 
concerned with situations that involve multiple 
newsvendors who make joint orders to satisfy the 
total demand they must meet. The savings achieved 
are then allocated in a manner that is advantageous 
to all the newsvendors. [59] was probably the first 
reported study of this area, which considered a 
three-player newsvendor game in both cooperative 
and noncooperative settings. Later, [60] studied a 
multi-retailer cooperative game, where each was 
faced by a newsvendor problem. They conditioned 
the non-emptiness of the core of the game based on 
some assumptions regarding the demand 
distribution. This result was generalized by [61] 
who showed that the cores of newsvendor games 
are non-empty irrespective of the demand 
distribution. [62] considered a multiple 
newsvendors game with multiple warehouses, 
which assumed that the amount of goods ordered 
became available after a non-null lead time. They 
showed that the retailers could increase their 
expected joint profits by coordinating their orders 
and making allocations after realizing the demand. 
They also proved that the associated game has a 
non-empty core. A similar model was developed 
based on an assumption that the reallocation of 
inventories occurs after a demand signal 
observation [26], which updates the information 
related to the demand distribution. 
The impacts of two classic contracting 
mechanisms (the wholesale price contract and the 
buyback contract) were discussed in three different 
scenarios: non-cooperating retailers, cooperating 
retailers, and manufacture resale of the returned 
items. [63] studied the cooperation between 
multiple newsvendors, by including non-identical 
selling and purchasing prices and transshipment. 
This study mainly showed that cooperative 
newsvendor games with transshipment have a 
nonempty core. Transshipment was also considered 
later in another game [64]. [65] focused on profit 
sharing mechanisms, where they studied a 
cooperative game between several retailers with 
normally distributed and correlated individual 
demands. They showed that when the holding and 
penalty shortage costs are identical for all subsets 
of stores, a game based on optimal expected costs 
(or the corresponding benefits) is subadditive and 
the core is never empty for normally distributed 
demands, irrespective of the correlations. When the 
holding and penalty costs of stores differ, the 
corresponding game may have an empty core. A 
similar result was given by [66], who showed that 
multiple newsvendors cooperative games with non-
identical holding and penalty costs may have an 
empty core. 
 
3.4 Economic Lot-sizing Games 
The economic lot-sizing model is one of the best 
known models in inventory theory, where it 
involves meeting the demand for an identical 
(possibly different) product during each phase of 
consecutive time periods. The demand during a 
given time period can be fulfilled by orders in that 
period or in previous periods. The objective is to 
decide the order quantity (lot) during each time 
period that satisfies the total demand at a minimum 
total cost [67]. Detailed surveys of lotsizing models 
were provided by [67, 68, 69, 70]. Next, we 
consider a situation where several retailers operate 
in a lot-sizing environment. In the decentralized 
case, each retailer solves a classic economic lot-
sizing problem to determine their optimal ordering 
policy. In the centralized case, the retailers may 
reduce their ordering costs by making joint orders. 
In a cooperative game theory setting, this situation 
is called the economic lot-sizing game. The 
standard form of this game was studied in [71], 
which considered a set of retailers who sell the 
same item purchased from the same supplier. The 
demand for the item is known over a multi-period 
time horizon. When an order is placed, the 
manufacturer charges the ordering cost and 
production cost according to a linear relationship 
with the amount of items ordered. In addition to 
these costs, the retailers are assumed to incur an 
inventory holding cost whenever a specific amount 
of the item is kept in stock from one period to the 
next. [71] showed that it is always profitable for a 
collective of retailers to cooperate, i.e., making 
joint orders yields some savings. When dealing 
with the problem of sharing savings, [71] showed 
that the economic lot-sizing game has a nonempty 
core. [72] considered a cooperative game between 
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multiple retailers who face an economic lot-sizing 
problem with a general concave ordering cost (the 
ordering cost is assumed to be a concave function 
of the order quantity). When they cooperate, the 
retailers form a coalition and place joint orders to a 
single supplier in order to re-duce their ordering 
costs. The demand in a given period can be 
backlogged and fulfilled by orders in later periods. 
The unfulfilled demand incurs a penalty cost to the 
retailer. [72] showed that the core of the economic 
lot-sizing game with backlogging costs is 
nonempty. Moreover, using a method based on 
linear programming duality, a core allocation may 
be computed in polynomial time. 
 
3.5 Inventory Games 
The class of inventory games refers to inventory 
cooperative situations, which are similar to those 
described above but they include continuous-time 
model assumptions. The economic order quantity is 
often used as a reorder policy in this class of 
inventory centralization games. The economic 
order quantity model has many uses and it is 
influential in production and inventory research. It 
was proposed in [73] and its basic form concerns 
inventory situations with an infinite time horizon 
and constant demand rate [67]. [74] studied the so-
called holding game where a collective of retailers 
may cooperate by sharing a storage capacity for 
their inventories. This holding game involves many 
agents, one of which has a capacitated storage 
facility. The available goods of other agents can be 
stored partially in the facility, thereby generating a 
certain benefit. The main questions addressed by 
this game aim to find an optimal holding plan and 
to distribute the benefit obtained. [75] consider a 
replenishment function based on the economic 
production quantity model where the order arrives 
gradually. In addition to making joint orders, the 
retailers share their holding facilities. This allows 
the firms to make their orders jointly and to store 
their items in the cheapest warehouse. It was shown 
that this inventory-production game is totally 
balanced and it has a nonempty core. [76] 
discussed a similar class of inventory-production 
games, where they considered a situation that 
allows a collective of retailers to share their 
production and inventory facilities. Thus, the 
required items are produced, stored, and 
backlogged by the player with the lowest 
production, holding, and backlogging costs. This 
production-inventory game was shown to satisfy 
the property of total balancedness, and thus the 
game has at least one core allocation. [77] 
considered a set of retailers, each of whom uses the 
economic order quantity model as a reorder policy 
to meet a deterministic demand rate. Each retailer 
has a linear holding cost and a fixed ordering cost. 
The retailers may reduce part of the fixed ordering 
cost by making joint orders. In this case, the sum of 
the ordering costs is reduced to only one cost, 
which is supported by the coalition of retailers. 
This form of inventory centralization is called an 
inventory game. [77] focused on the allocation of 
joint profits among different retailers. They showed 
that the game has a non-empty core and they 
proved that proportional allocation rules belong to 
the core. [78] extended the model of [77], where a 
major setup cost was incurred for each order in 
their cost structure, which was independent of the 
set of retailers who placed the order. In addition, a 
minor setup cost was incurred by each retailer 
included in the joint order. A necessary and 
sufficient condition was characterized, which was a 
threshold value for the shared ordering cost, below 
which it was optimal for all the retailers to order 
together and to have a non-empty core for the 
game. [38] studied the same model as [78], but they 
focused mainly on a class of easy to implement 
policies called power-of-two policies. They showed 
that under the optimal power-of-two policy, the 
cooperative game associated with the joint 
replenishment model with a first-order interaction 
is concave and thus it has a non-empty core. [79] 
extended the model of [38] to a more general 
cooperative game associated with the joint 
replenishment model, where the joint setup cost 
was a submodular function of the set of retailers 
who placed the order together. Similar to [38], the 
game was defined under an optimal power-of-two 
policy. [79] used the strong duality theorem to 
prove that the game has a non-empty core. In the 
aforementioned studies, the cooperative games only 
involve the set of firms/retailers in the system, 
whereas other supply chain parties such as 
suppliers are not formally included in the 
cooperative game. Indeed, we identified only one 
previous study ([80]) where the supplier 
participated explicitly in the cooperative process. In 
this study, [80] considered the coordination of 
actions and the allocation of profits in a supply  
chain where the supplier offers wholesale prices to 
induce the retailers to make large orders. Two types 
of cooperative situations were compared: the 
supplier was not considered to be a cooperating 
agent or the supplier could cooperate with the 
retailers. It was shown that it is preferable to 
include the supplier as a player in the cooperative 
game because the profit was higher in this case 
compared with a situation that exclusively 
considered cooperation among retailers. 
 
3.6 Inventory Games with Coalition 
Structures 
Alliance formation and games with coalition 
structures have received very little attention in 
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supply chain management research. Furthermore, 
few studies (approximately 10) have used 
cooperative game theory to investigate the 
formation of alliances and the interactions among 
them in supply chains. To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous studies have used the 
coalition structure core to analyze a game with a 
coalition structure in supply chain management 
research. However, several have analyzed the 
farsighted satiability of coalition structures in some 
supply chain games, including [81,82,83,84,85]. 
Most of these studies dealt with coalition stability 
in assembly models, although [85] considered the 
stability of group buying organizations. The 
authors in [82]  were probably the first to deal with 
farsighted stability in supply chain management. 
They focused mainly on the coalition structures 
with farsighted stability outcomes in a three-retailer 
cooperative game. [81] analyzed two contracting 
systems between an assembler and their suppliers. 
The push system allows the suppliers to set their 
price first before the assembler orders. In contrast 
to the push system, the assembler offers a price to 
each of the supplier first in the pull system, before 
the suppliers then determine the quantity. A grand 
coalition was shown to be the farsighted coalition 
structure with the push system, whereas any 
coalition structure could have farsighted stability 
under the pull system. For the assembly supply 
chain, [84]  considered an assembler who purchases 
n components from n suppliers to build and sell the 
final product. First, they considered the same cases 
as [81]: in one case, the suppliers were the 
Stackelberg leaders; and in the second case, the 
assembler was the Stackelberg leader. Moreover, 
they considered a case where the assembler and the 
suppliers made their decisions simultaneously. In 
this case, the authors characterized the farsighted 
coalition structures formed by the suppliers. [83] 
studied dynamic alliance formation among agents 
in competitive markets. They considered the 
problem of price competition in an n-agents game. 
The different agents sold substitutable products and 
they faced deterministic and stochastic demands. 
The farsighted agents could form alliances in order 
to determine a common price and compete against 
each other. [85]  analyzed the farsighted stability of 
group purchasing organizations. Group purchasing, 
also known as group buying, refers to group of 
many firms (buyers) that pool their purchasing 
requirements and buy large quantities of a 
particular product from a seller. This allows them 
to take advantage of significant quantity discounts 
from the seller. [85]  mainly considered three well 
known allocations, i.e., proportional allocations, 
equal allocations, and shapely value allocations, 
and investigated the farsighted stability of several 
group purchasing models. 
 
4 Discussion  
Analysing cooperation in supply chain networks 
using cooperative game theory is a fairly new 
research area in supply chain management. Thus, 
several questions have not been investigated fully 
or addressed. After analysing previous studies, we 
can conclude that most of the studies were only 
interested in the stability of one set of agents. For 
example, early studies (see Figure (2)) assumed 
that games are superadditive in the sense that it is 
beneficial for all supply chain agents to cooperate. 
Therefore, the non-emptiness of the core and the 
distribution of the savings available to the grand 
coalition of individuals have been investigated 
most frequently. The non-emptiness of the core and 
the superadditivity of games are interesting 
questions from a theoretical viewpoint. We should 
mention that superadditive games have been 
studied extensively, even in the theory of games, 
because they have nice theoretical properties. 
However, we consider that these issues are not 
sufficient to model the cooperation in supply chain 
networks. Thus, deeper and more detailed analyses 
are required to understand the interactions among 
firms in supply chain networks. 
In many situations, it is not sufficient to declare 
that the game admits a non-empty core, but we 
need to identify one such core allocation. Even if a 
core allocation is found, it is not sufficient to 
declare that the supply chain participants will use 
this allocation. This is because core allocations 
only guarantee immunity to group deviations 
(stability). However, some core allocations might 
be costly or complex to put into practice (e.g., they 
may require a third party to manage the money’s 
transfer between the partners). Moreover, core 
allocations often fail to consider the comparative 
payoffs attributed to each actor and they do not 
guarantee that the actors who contribute most to the 
alliance will be paid more. In these situations, it is 
easy to expect the disbanding of an alliance. 
We believe that these questions and many others 
should be investigated in supply chain networks 
where cooperation does not mean the elimination 
of rivalry among firms. We also mentioned that 
most of the previously investigated cooperative 
supply chain games are superadditive. In the 
following, we explain how this assumption restricts 
supply chain models. In supply chain net-works, as 
well as in general social networks, many situations 
are not superadditive in nature. Thus, in the 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt  Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2015 
20 
absence of superadditivity, forming a grand 
coalition is not necessarily efficient be-cause a 
higher aggregate payoff can be obtained with a 
different coalition structure. Furthermore, the 
superadditivity itself can be called into question. 
There are many reasons for doubting the formation 
of a grand coalition. For example, as explained by 
Aumann and Dreze  in [86], “acting together may 
be difficult, costly, or illegal, or the players may, 
for various personal reasons, not wish to do so.” 
Indeed, the formation and management of an 
alliance might incur costs such as coordination 
overheads, e.g., communication costs and third 
party logistic costs (when such a party is used). 
Alliance formation/management process costs have 
not been considered in cooperative games, but we 
believe that these cost components will be relevant 
and important in practice. If we consider these 
costs, a grand coalition might not be more 
attractive compared with a smaller coalition. 
Moreover, in many cases, acting together is 
difficult or even impossible for practical reasons 
(such as the geographic locations of the supply 
chain members) or due to some constraints on the 
supply chain. For example, in inventory games, the 
supplier (or the external warehouse) is assumed to 
have an infinite production capacity, thereby 
satisfying the large quantities ordered by the grand 
coalition. However, we expect that this assumption 
is very different from the actual economic situation. 
Finally, a grand coalition might not be formed due 
to rivalry and competition among firms. Some 
“competitors” might not want to cooperate with 
each other, even if it is beneficial for them to do so. 
Before ending this section, we would like to 
emphasize that in addition to the focus on the core 
and superadditivity, most previous cooperative 
supply chain games have dealt with cooperation 
exclusively using inventory-cost models. However, 
we consider that it is important to incorporate 
transportation decisions in supply chain 
cooperative models. Indeed, transportation costs 
may be as important as the inventory costs, and 
thus including such costs could model more 
realistic situations and highlight modern supply 
chain trends, such as green supply chains (e.g., by 
considering greenhouse gas emissions). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Conclusion  
This paper presents an analysis of the cooperation 
in supply chains in the light of cooperative game 
theory. We discussed the potential of cooperation 
and alliance formation for modern supply chains 
and highlighted the related challenges and barriers. 
The paper also presents a comprehensive literature 
review of recent and state-of-the-art papers in 
modelling the cooperation in supply chains by 
means of cooperative game theory. Several supply 
chain games were reviewed, categorized, and 
analysed to find the future directions and 
opportunities of research in this field. 
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Appendix 2: Classification of supply chain games 
 
